We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private information that is known only to him. Agents report their location to a central planner who decides where to locate the facility. The planner's objective is to minimize a "social" cost function that depends on the agent-costs. However, agents might not report truthfully; to address this issue, the planner must restrict himself to strategyproof mechanisms, in which truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for each agent. A mechanism that simply chooses the optimal solution is generally not strategyproof, and so the planner aspires to to use a mechanism that effectively approximates his objective function. This general class of problems was first studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz and has been the subject of much research since then.
Introduction
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of n agents, each of whom is located somewhere on the line as well. Each agent cares about his distance to the facility, and incurs a disutility (equivalently, cost) that is equal to his distance to access the facility. An agent's location is assumed to be private information that is known only to him. Agents report their locations to a central planner who decides where to locate the facility based on the reports of the agents. The planner's objective is to minimize a "social" cost function that depends on the vector of distances that the agents need to travel to access the facility. It is natural for the planner to consider locating the facility at a point that minimizes his objective function, but in that case the agents may not have an incentive to report their locations truthfully. As an example, consider the case of 2 agents located at x 1 and x 2 respectively, and suppose the location that optimizes the planner's objective in this case is the mid-point (x 1 + x 2 )/2. Then, assuming x 1 < x 2 , agent 1 has an incentive to report a location x ′ 1 < x 1 so that the planner's decision results in the facility being located closer to his true location. The planner can address this issue by restricting herself to a strategyproof mechanism: by this we mean that it should be a (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent to report his location truthfully to the central planner. This, of course, is an attractive property, but it comes at a cost: based on the earlier example, it is clear that the planner cannot hope to optimize her objective. One way to avoid this difficulty is to assume an environment in which agents (and the planner) can make or receive payments; in such a case, the planner selects the location of the facility, and also a payment scheme, which specifies the amount of money an agent pays (or receives) as a function of the reported locations of the agents as well as the location of the facility. This option gives the planner the ability to support the "optimal" solution as the outcome of a strategy-proof mechanism by constructing a carefully designed payment scheme in which any potential benefit for a misreporting agent from a change in the location of the facility is offset by an increase in his payment.
There are many settings, however, in which such monetary compensations are either not possible or are undesirable. This motivated Procaccia and Tennenholtz [6] to formulate the notion of Approximate Mechanism Design without Money. In this model the planner restricts herself to strategy-proof mechanisms, but is willing to settle for one that does not necessarily optimize her objective. Instead, the planner's goal is to find a mechanism that effectively approximates her objective function. This is captured by the standard notion of approximation that is widely used in the CS literature: for a minimization problem, an algorithm is an α-approximation if the solution it finds is guaranteed to have cost at most α times that of the optimal cost (α ≥ 1).
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [6] apply the notion of approximate mechanism design without money to the facility location problem considered here for two different objectives: (i) minisum, where the goal is to minimize the sum of the costs of the agents; and (ii) minimax, where the goal is to minimize the maximum agent cost. They show that for the minimax objective choosing any k-th median-picking the kth largest reported location-is a strategyproof, 2-approximate mechanism. They design a randomized mechanism called LRM (Left-Right-Middle) and show that it is a strategyproof, 3/2-approximate mechanism; futhermore, they show that those mechanisms provide the optimal worst-case approximation ratio possible (among all deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms, respectively). For the minisum objective, it is known that choosing the median reported location is optimal and strategyproof [5] . Feldman and Wilf [4] consider the same facility location problem on a line but with the social cost function being the L 2 norm of the agents' costs 1 . They show that the median is a √ 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism for this objective function, and provide a randomized (1 + √ 2)/2-approximate strategyproof mechanism. In addition, facility location on other topologies such as circles and trees are considered in Alon et al. [1, 2, 3] as well as in Feldman and Wilf [4] .
In our paper, we follow the suggestion of Feldman and Wilf [4] and study the problem of locating a single facility on a line, but with the objective function being the L p norm of the vector of agent-costs (for general p ≥ 1). We define the problem formally in section 2. In section 3, we show that the median mechanism (which is strategyproof) provides a 2 1− 1 p approximation ratio, and that is the optimal approximation ratio among all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We move onto randomized mechanisms in section 4. First, we consider the case of 2 agents, and show that the LRM mechanism provides the optimal approximation ratio among all randomized mechanisms (that satisfy certain mild assumptions) for this special case. Our result for the special case of 2 agents also gives a lower bound on the approximation ratio for all randomized mechanisms. Next, we present a negative result: we show that for p > 2, no mechanism-from a rather large class of randomized mechanisms-has an approximation ratio better than that of the median mechanism, as the number of agents goes to infinity. It is worth noting that all the mechanisms proposed in literature so far-for minimax, minisum, as well as quadratic mean social cost functions-belong to this class of mechanisms. We conclude in section 5 with a brief discussion of some directions for further research.
Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be the set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N reports a location x i ∈ R. A deterministic mechanism is a collection of functions f = {f n | n ∈ N, n ≥ 2} such that each f n : R n → R is a function that maps each location profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) to the location of a facility. We will abuse notation and let f (x) denote f n (x). Under a similar notational abuse, a randomized mechanism is a collection of functions f that maps each location profile to a probability distribution over R: if f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is the distribution π, then the facility is located by drawing a single sample from π.
Our focus will be on deterministic and randomized mechanisms for the problem of locating a single facility when the location of any agent is private information to that agent and cannot be observed or otherwise verified. It is therefore critical that the mechanism be strategyproof-it should be optimal for each agent i to report his true location x i rather than something else. To that end we assume that if the facility is located at y, an agent's disutility, equivalently cost, is simply his distance to y. Thus, an agent whose true location is x i incurs a cost C(x i , y) = |x i − y|. If the location of the facility is random and according to a distribution π, then the cost of agent i is simply C(x i , π) = E y∼π |x i − y|, where y is a random variable with distribution π. The formal definition of strategyproofness is now:
i ∈ R, and for each
where (α, x −i ) denotes a n vector where the i-th coordinate of the vector is α and the j-th coordinate of the vector is x j for all j = i.
The class of strategyproof mechanisms is quite large: for example, locating the facility at agent 1's reported location is strategyproof, but is not particularly appealing because it fails almost every conceivable notion of fairness and could also be highly "inefficient". To address these issues, and to winnow the class of acceptable mechanisms, we impose additional requirements that often stem from efficiency or fairness considerations. In this paper we assume that locating a facility at y for the location profile is x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) incurs the social cost
For a randomized mechanism f that maps x to a distribution π, we define the social cost to be
For this definition of social cost, our goal now is to find a strategyproof mechanism that does well with respect to minimizing the social cost. A natural mechanism (and this is the approach taken in the classical literature on facility location) is the "optimal" mechanism: each location profile
This optimal mechanism is not strategyproof as shown in the following example.
Example. Suppose there are two agents located at the points 0 and 1 respectively on the real line. If they report their locations truthfully, the optimal mechanism will locate the facility at y = 0.5, for any p > 1. Assuming agent 2 reports x 2 = 1, if agent 1 reports x ′ 1 = −1 instead, the facility will be located at 0, which is best for agent 1.
Given that strategyproofness and optimality cannot be achieved simultaneously, it is necessary to find a tradeoff. In this paper we shall restrict ourselves to strategyproof mechanisms that approximate the optimal social cost as best as possible. The notion of approxmation that we use is standard in computer science: an α-approximation algorithm is one that is guaranteed to have cost no more than α times the optimal social cost. Formally, the approximation ratio of an algorithm A is sup I {A(I)/OP T (I)}, where the supremum is taken over all possible instances I of the problem; and A(I) and OP T (I) are, respectively, the costs incurred by algorithm A and the optimal algorithm on the instance I.
Our goal then is to design strategyproof (deterministic or randomized) mechanisms whose approximation ratio is as close to 1 as possible.
The Median Mechanism
For the location profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), the median mechanism is a deterministic mechanism that locates the facility at the "median" of the reported locations. The median is unique if n is odd, but not when n is even, so we need to be more specific in describing the mechanism. For odd n, say n = 2k − 1 for some k ≥ 1, the facility is located at x [k] , where x [k] is the kth largest component of the location profile. For even n, say n = 2k, the "median" can be any point in the interval [
; to ensure strategyproofness, we need to pick either
, and as a matter of convention we take the median to be x [k] . It is well known that the median mechanism is strategyproof 3 . Furthermore, the median mechanism is anonymous 4 . Thus we may assume, 2 Strictly speaking, the mechanism is not well defined in cases where the social cost at x is minimized by multiple locations y, but we could pick an exogenous tie-braking rule to deal with such cases.
3 A classical paper of Moulin [5] for a closely related model shows that all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms are essentially generalized median mechanisms. 4 In an anonymous mechanism, the facility location is the same for two location profiles that are permutations of each other.
without loss of generality, that each agent reports her location truthfully. Our main result in this section is that, for any p ≥ 1, the median mechanism uniformly achieves the best possible approximation ratio among all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We start with two simple observations, which will be used repeatedly in the proof of this main result.
Lemma 1. For any real numbers
Proof. For any p ≥ 1, f (x) = x p is a convex function on [0, ∞), and so for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and
Setting λ = 1/2, x = c − b, and y = b − a, and multiplying both sides of the inequality by 2 p gives the result.
Lemma 2. For any non-negative real numbers a and b, and any p ≥ 1,
Proof. For integer p, the result is a direct consequence of the binomial theorem; the same argument covers the case of rational p as well. Continuity implies the result for all p. Proof. We may assume that x 1 ≤ ... ≤ x n . Let OP T be a facility location that minimizes the social cost, and let m be the median. The inequality we need to prove is
We do this by pairing each location x i with its "symmetric" location x n+1−i and arguing that the total cost of these two locations in the median mechanism is within the required bound of their total cost in an optimal solution. For even n, this completes the argument; for odd n the only location without such a pair is the median itself, which incurs zero cost in the median mechanism, and so the argument is complete. Formally, the result follows if we can show
We consider two cases, depending on whether OP T is in the interval [x i , x n+1−i ] or not. In each of these cases, OP T may be above the median or below, but the proof remains identical in each subcase, so we give only one.
1. x i ≤ m ≤ OP T ≤ x n+1−i or x i ≤ OP T ≤ m ≤ x n+1−i . We will prove the first of these subcases; the proof of the second is identical. Applying Lemma 1 by setting a = m, b = OP T , and c = x n+1−i , we get
where the last inequality is obtained by applying Lemma 2 to the terms |m − x i | p and |OP T − m| p .
OP T ≤ x
Again, we prove only the first subcase. Note that
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2. (Note that Lemma 1 is not used in the proof of this case.)
We end this section by showing that no deterministic and strategyproof mechanism can give a better approximation to the social cost. (x 1 , x 2 ) with x 1 < x 2 . For p ≥ 1, suppose the social cost of locating a facility at y is (|x 1 
Lemma 3. Consider the case of two agents and suppose the location profile is
Any determinstic mechanism whose approximation ratio is better than 2 1− 1 p for p > 1 must locate the facility at y for some y ∈ (x 1 , x 2 ).
Proof. The function f (y) = |y − x 1 | p + |y − x 2 | p is strictly convex, and its unique minimizer is y * = (x 1 + x 2 )/2, with the corresponding value f (y * ) = |x 2 
. It follows that for the deterministic mechanism to do strictly better than the stated ratio, the facility cannot be located at the reported locations; locating the facility to the left of x 1 or to the right of x 2 only increases the cost of the mechanism, so the only option left for a mechanism to do better is to locate the facility in the interior, i.e., in (x 1 , x 2 ).
Theorem 2. Any strategyproof deterministic mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least
Proof. The bound holds trivially for p = 1. Suppose p > 1, and suppose a deterministic strategyproof mechanism yields an approximation ratio strictly better than 2
For the two-agent location profile x 1 = 0, x 2 = 1, Lemma 3 implies the facility is located at some y ∈ (0, 1). Now consider the location profile x 1 = 0, x 2 = y. Again, by Lemma 3, the mechanism locate the facility at y ′ ∈ (0, y) to guarantee the improved approximation. But if agent 2 is located at y < 1, he can misreport his location as 1, forcing the mechanism to locate the facility at y, his true location; this violates strategyproofness.
Randomized Mechanisms
Recall that when the social cost is measured by the L 2 norm or the L ∞ norm, randomization provably improves the approximation ratio. In the former case, Feldman and Wilf [4] describe an algorithm whose approximation ratio is ( √ 2 + 1)/2; for the latter, Procaccia and Tennenholtz [6] design an algorithm with an approximation ratio of 3/2. The mechanisms in both cases are simple and somewhat similar, placing non-negative probabilities only on the optimal and reported locations, where these probabilities are independent of the reported location profile. There are two reasonable ways of choosing the reported locations: one is via dictatorships and the other is via generalized medians. In this section we show that the former is not enough; namely, randomizing over the dictatorships and the optimal location does not improve the approximation ratio of the median mechanism for all p ∈ (2, ∞). For the case of 2 agents we show that the best approximation ratio is given by the LRM mechanism among all strategyproof mechanisms. Extending this analysis even to the case of 3 agents appears to be highly non-trivial.
Mixing Dictatorships with the Optimal Location
We first show that any strategyproof randomized mechanism that places location-independent probabilites on dictatorships and the location of OP T (the unique minimizer of the L p social cost function) cannot have an approximation ratio better than that of the median mechanism for any p ∈ (2, ∞). 6 The lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio also holds when p = ∞, see Procaccia and Tennenholtz [6] .
Proof. Let y denote the facility's location and x ′ i ≥ 1 denote the reported location of agent i. When all other agents report their locations truthfully, the social cost as a function of y ∈ [0, 1] given the location profile
f (y) = sc(x ′ , y) p is differientable on (0, 1) with f ′ (y) on (0, 1) being:
For OP T to be located at 1, f ′ (1 − ) must equal 0. By the convexity of f , it suffices to find
Solving for x ′ i and we get the desired result.
Lemma 5. Let A be any strategyproof randomized mechanism that places location-independent probabilites on dictatorships and OP T . Then, for the location profile with n = 2k agents in which k agents are at zero and k agents are at 1, the probability that A locates the facility at OP T tends to zero as k → ∞.
Proof. Let i be an agent located at 1, and let x −i denote the location profile of all other agents. Letp denote the probability A locates the facility at OP T ; and for j = 1, . . . , n, letq j denote the probability that A locates the facility at the reported location of agent j. Then the strategyproofness of A implies that the difference between the cost to agent i when he reports truthfully versus when he misreports
and Lemma 4 implies that OP T is located at 1 in the reported profile. The facility location does not change except when OPT or agent i's location is chosen by the mechanism. Hence, the only two terms that survive in the difference of the cost functions are the term corresponding to OP T and the term corresponding to agent i's location. Consequently, we have thatp(1 − 0.5) −q i (1 + k 1 p−1 − 1) ≤ 0, which implies thatq i ≥p/2k 1 p−1 . By symmetry of the location profile, for any agent i located at 0, strategyproofness again implies thatq i ≥p/2k 1 p−1 . Thus, we have that
Solving forp, we observe thatp ≤ , which goes to 0 as k goes to infinity for any p > 2.
Lemma 6. Let A be any random (not necessarily uniform) dictator mechanism. Consider the location profile with n = 2k agents, in which k agents are located at 0 and k agents are located at 1. Then the approximation ratio of A is at least 2
Proof. Letq i be the probability that the mechanism locates the facility at x i . The expected social cost under the random dictator mechanism is 
Optimality of the LRM Mechanism for 2 Agents
Our next result shows that the LRM mechanism provides the best possible approximation ratio among all shift and scale invariant (defined below) startegyproof mechanisms for the case of 2 agents for all L p social cost functions for p ≥ 1.
We begin with some definitions: we say that a mechanism f is shift and scale invariant if for every location profile x = {x 1 , x 2 } s.t. x 1 ≤ x 2 and every c ∈ R, the following two properties are satisfied:
2. When c ≥ 0, we have f ({cx 1 , cx 2 }) = cf (x), and when c < 0, we have
A convenient notation for a given location profile x is to denote its midpoint as m x = x 1 +x 2 2 . We say that a mechanism f is symmetric if for all location profile x and for any y ∈ R, P(f (x) ≥ m x + y) = P(f (x) ≤ m x − y).
The following lemma allows us to convert any strategyproof mechanism into a symmetric mechanism.
Lemma 7. Given any strategyproof mechanism, there exists another symmetric strategyproof mechanism with the same approximation ratio.
Proof. Given a mechanism f , we define the mirror mechanism of f , f mirror , to be such that for any profile x, we have that P(f mirror (x) ≥ m x + b) = P(f (x) ≤ m x − b) for all b ∈ R and location profiles x. Assume f is a strategyproof mechanism. Symmetry dictates that f mirror must also be strategyproof, since any misreport of the right agent with respect to f induces the same cost as that of an equivalent a misreport of the left agent with respect to f mirror and vice versa. Moreover, since composing two strategproof mechanisms yields a strategyproof mechanism, the mechanism g = 1 2 f + 1 2 f mirror is a strategyproof mechanism which is also symmetric. Finally, note that g has the same approximation ratio as f for all location profiles, since f mirror has the same approximation ratio as f .
From now on, whenever we talk about a shift and scale invariant mechanism, we will also assume that it is symmetric. To simplify our proof of the main result, we will assume in addition that given a reported profile x = {x 1 , x 2 }, the mechanism will only assign a facility location that lies in between x 1 and x 2 , i.e. P(y ∈ [x 1 , x 2 ]) = 1, where y is a random variable representing the facility location assigned by the mechanism. It is worth noting that the main result remains true even without this assumption, although the complete proof is somewhat long and cumbersome, so we will omit it. The next lemma deals with an equivalent condition for strategyproofness with respect to a shift, scale invariant and symmetric mechanism.
Lemma 8. A shift, scale invariant, and symmetric mechanism f is strategyproof if and only if for any profile x = {x 1 , x 2 } with x 1 = 0 < x 2 , the following condition hold:
Proof. By shift invariance, it suffices to check strategyproofness for profiles where x 1 = 0 and by symmetry, we can assume without lost of generality that x 2 ≥ 0. Moreover, any shift, scale invariant mechanism is trivially strategyproof with respect to the profile {0, 0} since by definition, the mechanism would place all of the probability mass on 0, which means that no agent has incentive to misreport his location. Thus, we can assume that x 2 > 0. Since the mechanism is symmetric, it suffices to show that agent 2 cannot benefit by deviating from his true location if and only if the aforementioned condition hold. Since x 2 > 0, we can denote agent 2's deviation x ′ 2 as cx 2 for some c ∈ R. Moreover, since P(Y ∈ [x 1 , x 2 ]) = 1 by assumption, we can further restrict ourselves to the case where c > 1 because agent 2 has no incentive to deviate to a location cx 2 where cx 2 < x 2 as the mechanism is scale invariant.
When agent 2 reports his location to be cx 2 , where c > 1, the change in cost incurred by agent An immediate consequence of Theorem 4 is the following corollary. 
Discussion
The most imporant open question in our view is whether or not randomization can help improve the worst-case approximation ratio for general L p norm cost functions. The case of p = 1 is uninteresting because there is an optimal deterministic mechanism; for p = 2 and p = ∞ we already saw that randomization improves the worst-case approximation ratio, but we do not know if this is simply a happy coincidence, or if one can obtain similar results for all p > 2.
There are many other natural questions as well: for instance, what happens for more general topologies such as trees or cycles? Is it possible to characterize all randomized strategy-proof mechanisms on specific topologies?
Finally, we believe it is of interest to consider more general cost functions for the individual agents. The properties established for the LRM and many other mechanisms depend on the assumption that agents incur costs that are exactly equal to the distance to access the facility. Clearly, this is a very restrictive assumption, and working with more general individual agent costs is a promising direction to broaden the applicability of this class of models.
